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In 2016, Mr. Childers-Gray and Ms. Rice filed petitions to change their 
names and sex designations with the state registrar. (Op. Br. at 5.) In both cases, 
the court agreed to order the state registrar to change the name but not the sex 
designation. (Op. Br. at 5.) This means that, since 2016, each of their birth 
certificates list a gender that does not match their first name. (Op. Br. at 9.)  
This court heard oral argument in this case on January 8, 2018. The court 
then stayed its disposition of this case pending its resolution of In re Gestational 
Agreement. 2019 UT 40, ¶ 101 n.95, 449 P.3d 69 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring). The 
opinion in In re Gestational Agreement was issued in August of 2019.  
In the opinion, the court expressed concern with adjudicating an appeal 
where, by statute, “no adverse party may exist.” Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The court cited the 
“general[]” rule that, “in the absence of any justiciable controversy between 
adverse parties, the courts are without jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). But the court held that a lack of adversariness is not a 
jurisdictional defect where the case involves a function that was “intended by the 
framers of our constitution to be included in the constitutional grant to the 
judiciary.” Id. ¶ 13. Thus, the court concluded that courts have jurisdiction over 
non-adversarial cases “over which Utah courts had historical power to preside.” 
Id. 
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Justice Pearce wrote separately and argued that adversariness had never 
become an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Id. ¶¶ 56–71 (Pearce, J., 
concurring). Associate Chief Justice Lee wrote separately to respond to Justice 
Pearce’s concurrence. Id. ¶ 101 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring). He argued that 
adversariness is, and has long been, an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Id. 
¶¶ 105–36 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring).  
Associate Chief Justice Lee also stated that “the analysis in our opinions in 
this case no doubt will inform the determination of whether In re Gray & Rice is 
properly before us,” but that “[he] would prefer to postpone [the court’s] 
resolution of these issues for a case in which they are directly implicated—in In re 
Gray & Rice or in some other future case.” Id. ¶ 101 n.95 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring). 
Shortly thereafter, this court issued a supplemental briefing order in this 
case on the following questions: 
1. Does the lack of adversariness prevent this Court 
from exercising jurisdiction over this matter? In re 
Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 12, 449 P.3d 69. 
2. Is an application seeking approval of an amendment 
to a birth certificate a matter “intended by the framers 
of our constitution to be included in the constitutional 
grant [of power] to the judiciary? Id. ¶ 13. If not, does it 
resemble other matters our state courts handled at the 
time of statehood? 
3. Does Utah Code Section 26-2-11 violate Article V of 
the Utah Constitution or otherwise violate the 
separation of powers principle? 
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There are no jurisdictional problems in this case. As to the first question, 
neither the Utah Constitution nor the Utah common law impose an adversariness 
requirement. But even if they did, the requirement is satisfied where, like here, 
there is the potential for an adversary. As pointed out by the Utah Attorney 
General, an actual adversary is not required.  
There is also a good reason why an actual adversary cannot be required in 
these cases. Requiring an adversary would mean that a person could change his 
name or sex designation only if someone did not want him to. This cannot be, 
and is not, the law. The answer to the first question is “no.” 
As to the second question, an application to amend a birth certificate is not 
a matter intended by the framers of our constitution to be included within the 
judicial power. As explained by the Utah Attorney General, birth certificates as 
we know them did not exist at that time. But the petitions filed here resemble 
other matters handled by courts at the time of statehood. Indeed, district courts 
have consistently handled name changes since 1884—before, during, and after 
statehood. The answer to the second question is “yes.” 
As to the third question, there is no separation of powers problem with the 
statute requiring the state registrar to amend a birth certificate after a person has 
a name or sex change approved by a court. The statute does not instruct the state 
registrar (an executive agency) to exercise the powers properly belonging to 




1. This Court Has Jurisdiction Despite the Lack of Adversariness 
The lack of adversariness does not prevent this court from exercising 
jurisdiction. This is true for three reasons.  
First, the Utah Constitution does not require adversariness to invoke this 
court’s jurisdiction. As pointed out in Justice Pearce’s concurring opinion, the 
adversariness requirement is rooted in the “case and controversy” language in 
the U.S. Constitution but absent from the Utah Constitution. In re Gestational 
Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 66–67, 449 P.3d 69 (Pearce, J., concurring).  
The U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” 
and “Controversies”: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to 
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;--
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
But the Utah Constitution provides no such limitation on Utah courts. It 
vests the “judicial power of the state” in the Utah district and appellate courts, 
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without reference to the adversariness requirement contained in the federal 
constitution: 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction 
known as the district court, and in such other courts as 
the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme 
Court, the district court, and such other courts 
designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts 
not of record shall also be established by statute. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 1. 
And instead of limiting jurisdiction to cases and controversies, the Utah 
Constitution vests this court with the jurisdiction over any matter “provided by 
statute,” like the name and sex designation change statute: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, 
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for 
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3.1 District courts have jurisdiction over “all matters 
except as limited by this constitution or by statute.” Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5. In 
                                              
1 Nor is Utah alone. As one commentator has observed: 
State courts, however, are not bound by Article III, 
and judicial practice in some states differs—and differs 
radically—from the federal model. Some state courts 
issue advisory opinions, grant standing to taxpayers 
challenging misuse of public funds, and decide 
important public questions even when federal courts 
would consider the disputes moot. Moreover, functions 
that seem intuitively nonjudicial in the federal system 
are assigned to the judicial branch in some states, and 
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other words, Utah courts are not limited to cases, but instead may exercise 
jurisdiction over all matters.2  
As this court has recognized, “[u]nlike the federal system, the judicial 
power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the language of 
Article III of the United States Constitution requiring ‘cases’ and ‘controversies,’ 
since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.” Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).3 Under both the plain language of the Utah 
                                                                                                                                                  
judicial officers discharge them comfortably. State 
judges in Tennessee appoint the attorney general, and 
some state constitutions establish sheriffs as part of the 
judicial, and not the executive, branch. Elsewhere 
(although only occasionally) state judges initiate 
investigations into public conditions without any 
request from a party or the public. In addition, as 
common law courts, all state courts play an accepted 
policymaking role in a broad range of complex areas, 
including disputes related to state indebtedness, 
territorial annexation, and redistricting. 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1836–38 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
2 As set forth below, the distinction between cases and matters was significant 
to the framers of the Utah Constitution, who wanted to grant jurisdiction to courts 
over “matters,” not “cases” alone. Utah Constitutional Debate, Day 50, Monday, 22 
April, 1895 (attached at Addendum A) (available at 
https://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/50.htm). 
3 In fact, the case and controversy requirements do not apply to state courts 
even when adjudicating federal questions. After observing that it may be “odd 
that a state court might have the authority to hear a federal constitutional claim in 
a setting where a federal court would not,” the Seventh Circuit noted that “it is 
clear that Article III’s ‘case or controversy’ limitations apply only to the federal 
courts.” Smith v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 
1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989)). 
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Constitution, and the language deliberately left out of the Utah Constitution, 
adversariness is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Second, the Utah common law does not require adversariness as a 
prerequisite to this court’s jurisdiction. As also pointed out in Justice Pearce’s 
concurring opinion, this court has never held that adversariness is a prerequisite 
to jurisdiction. In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 62 (Pearce, J., 
concurring). Admittedly, this court has repeatedly referred to adversariness as a 
“general,” “normal[],” “ordinar[]y,” or “traditional” prerequisite. Id. ¶ 12, 13, 57 
& n. 79 (Pearce, J., concurring). But as Justice Pearce points out, the limit of this 
court’s judicial power was not presented in any of those opinions. Id. ¶¶ 60, 62. 
And this court’s dicta, while informative, do not create a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. Callahan v. Salt Lake City, 125 P. 863, 864 (Utah 1912) (“A ‘dictum’ is 
an opinion expressed by the court, but which, not being necessarily involved in 
the case, lacks the force of an adjudication.”). 
Third, even if adversariness were required under the Utah Constitution or 
the Utah common law, there need not be an actual adversary in a case—the 
potential for adversariness satisfies the requirement, as pointed out in the Office 
of the Utah Attorney Generals’ Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae. (Amicus 
Curiae Br. at 3–6.) Even in federal cases—where the adversariness requirement is 
a constitutional requirement—this potential for adversariness satisfies the test. 
(Id. at 4–6.)  
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And in Utah, the notion that a potential adversary is sufficient is reflected 
in Citizens’ Club v. Welling, where this court explained that the “term ‘judicial 
power of courts’ is generally understood to be the power to hear and determine 
controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation.” 27 P.2d 23, 26 
(Utah 1933) (emphasis added). This language recognizes that adversariness and 
litigation are not always coextensive, and in so doing, recognizes that actual 
adversariness is not always required. This explains why, since as early as 1888, 
Utah courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate uncontested probate cases. In re 
Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 63 (Pearce, J., concurring (citing II Utah 
Comp. Laws § 4016 (1888))). 
Similarly, the framers of the Utah Constitution expressly drafted Article V 
to grant jurisdiction to courts over “matters,” not “cases” alone. Utah 
Constitutional Debate, Day 50, Monday, 22 April, 1895 (attached at Addendum 
A) (available at https://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/50.htm). During the 
convention, the framers discussed the language that would abolish probate 
courts and give the district courts jurisdiction over probate matters. The 
discussion highlighted the difference between “matters” and “cases”: 
MR. CRANE: Mr. Chairman, I wish to make an 
amendment to this section. I wish to strike out . . . the 
word “matters” and the word “and” after the word 
“civil” and insert between the word “criminal” and the 
word “not” the words “and probate matters.” 
MR. THURMAN: Mr. Chairman, I do not see what is 
the object of that; the words “civil and criminal not 
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excepted in this constitution and not prohibited by 
law,” will cover everything relating to probate matters, 
as well as anything else. The object of this section is to 
give the district court jurisdiction over every case that is 
not given to the supreme court and is not given 
exclusively to justices of the peace. It means that and it 
says that. It does not say “cases,” but all matters, and 
probate matters are civil matters; they are not criminal. 
They belong to chancery jurisdiction.”  
Id. (emphasis added). Uncontested probate matters, and uncontested divorces, 
are not beyond the judicial power even though the interests of all parties align.   
Regardless, as the Utah Attorney General points out, the statute here 
expressly contemplates that a petition can be challenged by an interested person, 
a possibility that satisfies any adversariness requirement. (Amicus Curiae Br. at 
3–4.) And historically, interested parties have in fact challenged name change 
petitions. (Id. at 5 (citing In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 833, 835 n.3 (Utah 1996).)  
The name and sex designation change statute therefore does not raise the 
concerns addressed in In re Gestational Agreement, where the statute expressly 
required that “no adverse party may exist.” 2019 UT 40, ¶ 11. The fact that 
Ms. Rice’s and Mr. Childers-Gray’s petitions are unopposed does not deprive 
this court of jurisdiction. 
2. District Courts Have Handled Name-Change Petitions Since Statehood 
A petition seeking an amendment to a birth certificate seeks a change to 
matters that Utah state courts handled at the time of statehood. Indeed, as the 
Utah Attorney General points out, since statehood, Utah statutes have always 
 10 
vested courts with the jurisdiction to hear name change applications. (Amicus 
Curiae Br. at 8–11.)  
This is dispositive here because, as this court recognized in In re Gestational 
Agreement, courts have “judicial power” to perform functions “over which Utah 
courts had historical power to preside, notwithstanding the absence of a 
controversy between adverse parties.” 2019 UT 40, ¶ 13, 449 P.3d 69. Thus, this 
court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal regardless of whether there is an 
adversariness requirement and regardless of whether it is satisfied here. 
To be clear, a petition seeking a sex designation change is no different from 
a name change. As pointed out in the opening brief, a sex designation on a birth 
certificate is the same as a name—they are both designations that reflect a 
person’s legal status. (Op. Br. at 12–15.) This explains why the statute addresses 
them together—“Name or sex change.” Utah Code § 26-2-11. 
And as the Utah Attorney General explains, the history of name change 
statutes shows that courts have handled name changes since statehood. (Amicus 
Curiae Br. at 8–11.) This was not true before statehood, however. Prior to 1884, 
the authority to hear name change applications was vested with the Utah 
Legislature, not with the district courts. After an applicant would present his 
case, the legislature would vote to decide whether the applicant should be 
allowed to change his name. E.g., Name Change Act, Jan. 30, 1872 (changing the 
surnames of several people); Name Change Act, Feb. 20, 1878 (changing the 
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name of Ephraim Powell to Ephraim Brettel Bolton); Name Change Act, Jan. 26, 
1880 (changing name of Hans Jorgen Christiansen to Hans Jorgen Rasmussen); 
Name Change Act, Mar 13, 1884 (changing the name of six people) (attached at 
addendum B). 
In 1884, Utah first adopted a name change law. Utah Comp. Laws, Code of 
Civil Procedure, Title VIII, §§ 1128–1131 (1884) (attached at Addendum C). The 
statute vested district courts with the authority to hear name change 
applications. Id. 
In 1888, the Utah Legislature revised the statute but did not change the 
district court’s authority to hear name change applications: “Applications for 
change of names must be heard and determined by the district courts.” Utah 
Comp. Laws, Volume II, Code of Civil Procedure, Title VIII, §§ 3861–3864 (1888) 
(attached at Addendum D). 
In 1898—soon after the Utah Constitution was ratified—the Utah 
Legislature again revised the statute and again required name-change petitions 
to be filed in the district court. Revised Statutes of Utah, §§ 1545–1547 (1898) 
(attached at Addendum E).  
The framers made clear that the name changes should be heard by the 
courts, and no longer by the legislature. Indeed, the Utah Constitution originally 
expressly prohibited the legislature from “[c]hanging the names of persons.” 
Utah Const. art. VI, § 26(2) (1896) (attached at Addendum F). Thus, an 
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amendment to a birth certificate resembles name changes, which were handled 
by courts at the time of statehood. 
In the first part of the second question in the supplemental briefing order, 
this court also asked whether a petition seeking an amendment to a birth 
certificate is a matter “‘intended by the framers of our constitution to be included 
in the constitutional grant [of power] to the judiciary.’” (Suppl. Briefing Order at 
1–2.) The answer to that part of the question is “no.” A petition seeking an 
amendment to a birth certificate is not a matter intended by the framers of our 
constitution to be included in the constitution because, as the Utah Attorney 
General notes, “birth certificates as we know them did not exist” at the time of 
statehood. (Amicus Curiae Br. at 10–11.) Thus, “the court order granting a name 
change did not and does not approve an amendment to a birth certificate.” (Id. at 
10.) But while the framers did not intend any branch of government (including 
the judiciary) to amend birth certificates (because they did not exist), the name 
change statutes reveal that this would have been within the judicial power.   
3. Utah Code Section 26-2-11 Does Not Violate the Separation of Powers 
Utah Code Section 26-2-11 requires the state registrar to amend a birth 
certificate after a person has a name or sex change approved by a court. Utah 
Code § 26-2-11(2). This section does not violate the separation of powers 
principle because it does not instruct the state registrar (an executive agency) to 
exercise the powers properly belonging to another governmental department. 
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The registrar need only comply with a court order issued pursuant to a statute. 
Under these circumstances, the refusal to comply with a court order would raise 
more concern than compliance with the statute would.  
Article V of the Utah Constitution provides that none of the three branches 
of government may exercise the powers properly belonging to another branch. 
Utah Const. art. V, § 1. Specifically, it provides that “[t]he powers of the 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted.” Id.  
Under this separation of powers, the executive branch has the power to 
enforce the rules enacted by the legislature. Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 37, 
269 P.3d 141. “Once a general rule is established by the legislature, its 
enforcement is left to the executive (by applying it to the particularized 
circumstances of individuals, through functions like prosecution or 
licensing) and its adjudication is left to the judiciary (by resolving specific 
disputes between parties as to the applicability of the law to their actions).” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
Here, the statute instructs the executive branch to enforce a district court’s 
determination that a person is entitled to a name change. This is precisely the 
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division of power contemplated by article V and the separation of powers 
principle. As the Utah Attorney General points out, “[a]t most, the statute merely 
assumes that courts have preexisting jurisdiction to address name- and sex-
change petitions.” (Amicus Curiae Br. at 16.) 
If the statute had granted authority to the state registrar to determine 
whether a name change was appropriate (a judicial function), then the separation 
of powers principle might have been violated. But because the statute directs the 
state registrar to exercise only its executive power, there is no such problem. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above and in the Utah Attorney General’s brief, 
the answers to the questions in the supplemental briefing order are “no,” “yes,” 
and “no.” 
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MR. GOODWIN: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's f i r s t 
amenrinent, section 7, " d i s t r i c t court and the judges 
thereof," i t seems to ne, i t would be more euphonious 
to say, "the d i s t r i c t courts and any judge thereof -" 
MR. VARIAN: I guess i t vould. 
THE CHAIRMAN: If there i s no objection tha*. change wil l 
be made. 
MR. CRANE: Mr. Chairman, I wish to make an amendment 
to t h i s sect ion. I wish to s t r i ke out in sect ion 7, 
l ine 2, the word "matters" and the word "and" aTter 
the vord "c iv i l " and Inser t between the word "ctlminal" 
and the word "not" the woi-ds "and probate mat ters ." 
SIR. THUKMAN: Mr- Chairmm., I do not see what i s the 
object of tha t ; the words "c iv i l and criminal not 
exc-pted ln thlc cons' . l tution and not prohibited by 
law," will cover everything re la t ing to probate 
matters , as ve i l as anything e l se . The object of 
th i s section i s to give to the d i s t r i c t court 
Jur isdic t ion over every case thut i s not given to the 
supreme court and i s not given exclusively to tna 
jus t ices of the peace. I t means that and i t says 
t ha t . I t does not say "casec", bat a l l mat ters , , and 
probate na t te r s a-e c i v i l matters; they are not crimi-




We discussed that matter ln the committee. 
HR. CRA'lE: I vould like to ask the gentleman 
from Utah County vhat it means, "and not prohibited 
by law?" 
HR. THURMAIi": "Not prohibited by law* simply means 
anything that is not prohibited tc this jurisdiction, 
which this court has. 
MR. CRANE: I vas brought to that thought, Mr. 
Thurman, by reading ln secticn 1, "and such other courts 
Inferior to the supreme court." It seems to me that 
you are giving the legislature power to institute 
any other courts they may see proper ir. tbe years 
tc come. You are laying the foundation here of the 
judicial pov.er of the state and vhat the Judiciary 
shall consist of, etc., snd th-.n you give the legis-
lature peer to lnttitute other courts Inferior to the 
supreme court, is that the idea? 
HR. THURlAN: Yes, the object is to give the 
legislature the power to institute courts inferior 
to the supreme court. 
MR. CRAi.E: Any other courts tbey may choose? 
MR. THURMAll: Yes, we have limited the pover, If 
you will notice of a justice of the peuce. I do not 
call to mind the section thut it Is now, but I would 
like to rend that in anS—ar to your question. It is 
ln section 8. How, the Intention was to restrict the 
Jurisdiction of the Justic s of the peuce or 
rather not to allow an incresae of that Jurisdiction, 
that they never should have probate jurisdiction or 
anything else above what they have got to-day under 
50-89. 
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the laws of the t e r r i t o r y . The l eg i s l a tu re might 
cut i t down, but they could not increase i t . Now, 
suppose the l eg i s la tu re should want to create 
probate cou t s hereafter and confer upon them the 
power to t ransact probate business, then section 1 
would mean that the judic ia l power of the s ta te 
shal l he vested in the senate, e t c . , (Read*-) . 
MR. CRA'TE: I t seems to i e , Iir. Chairnian, that the 
idea of this a r t i c l e and a i l the a r t i c l e s in th i s 
cons t i tu t ion would be to c u r t a i l the pover of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . I t seems to me in t h i s a r t i c l e 
you are jus t giving the l eg i s la tu re a l l the power 
that the- ever had regardless of a const i tu t ion , 
by giving them the right to i n s t i t u t e any new courts 
tha t they might see proper in years to come. The idea 
of my amendment was that I t should emphasize the 
fact that the d i s t r i c t court had the power--
MR. THURMAN: Do I understand now that th i s i s a 
question or a speech? 
HR. CRA""E: NO; i t i s a question sn reply to yours 
or rath r an answer. 
MR. THURMAN: Oh, i t i s an answer? 
MR. CRANE: My idea in t h i s amendment wus to cu r t a i l 
the power of the l e g i s l a t u r e . That i s the idea I 
suprose of th i s a r t i c l e and to emphasise the Tact 
that they hud powers in probate matters a 
MR. THUKMAN: Would you withhold the power 
Trom the l eg i s l a tu re to es tab l i sh in the yeare to come 
IT they desire a probate court in each county? 
HH. CRAIJ. : Yes; I think I would. 
50-00. 
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UR. THUKMAN: Well, the committee did not— 
HR. CRANE: lr you have as many Judges as this article 
colls Tor, you would never nedd any probate judges. 
MR. THUHMAN: The committee dlTTered with you and 
thourht it be ter to rive the legislature power in 
that matter ln the ruture to establish inTerior courts. 
The amendment oT Mr. Crane was rejected. 
Section 8 wus read. 
MR. EI-llNOi:: I desire to ask the chairman oT the 
Judlciary Committee a questien. Are the justices 
of the peace to he elected at large in the county or 
to be elected in the several precincts? 
MR. 8O0DWI!.': Just as the legislature may provide. 
It is given in the hands or the legislature. 
Section 9 was read. 
MR. VARIAN: Mr. Chairman, in line 3, the right 
of appeal seems to be limited tc questions or law alone. 
I do not know why that restriction is sought to be 
placed ir. the constitution. It might be very 
approprittes* in criminal cases, but us broadly as 
thut Is stated, it seems to me there might be some 
question as to how It would be Interpreted in equity 
cases. In equity cases the whole substance and gist of 
of the mattsr on appeal and everyvhere else is tho 
fact. The evidence goes up. Hie determination ln an 
equity cause is not made on l(olatsd propositions of lav, 
but simply as It Is prescribed hy the i«w whole Tacts. 
It occurs to me that may be safely leTt to the legla-
lature. I move to etrike out, "on queetlono cf law 
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LAWS OF UTAH.
Excetions. SEC. 1124. Nothing in this Code must be construedto abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the takingof property in any city or town for street purposes.
TITLE VIII.
OF C1hANGE OF NAMES.
jurisdiction. SEC. 1128. Applications for change of names nmustbe heard and determined by the district courts.
Application for SEC. 1129. All applications for change of names
change of name, ust be made to the district court of the judicial district
how ,,ade, where the person whose name is l)roposc(l to be changed
resides, by petition, signed by such person; and if such
person is under tWenty-one uyars of it'ge, by one of the par-
cts, if living; or if both be dead, then by the guardian;
and if there e no guardian, then by some near relation or
friend. The petition must specify the place of birth and
residence of such person, his or her present me, the name
proposed, and the reason for such change of name, and
must, if the father of such person be not living, name as
thr as known to the petitioner, the near relatives of such
chaneofln, person, and -their place of residence. Any religious, be-
of. nevolent, literary or scientific corporation, or any corpora-
tion bearing or having for its mie or using or being
known by the name of any benevolent or charitable order,
or society, may, by petition, apply to the district court of the
.judicial district in which the property of said corporation
is situated, for a change of its corporate name. Such pe-
tition must be signed by the trustees of the corporation, or
by a majority of them, and must specify tile date of the
formation of the corporation, its present name, the name
proposed, and the reason for such change of name. Upon
filing such petition on behalf of such corporation, the samne
proceedings must be had as upon application for changes of
name of natural persons.
'ublicatlion of SEC. 1130. A copy of such petition must be pub-
petition for. lished for four sueccssive weeks, in some newspaper
printed in the judicial (lFstrict, if a nwespaper be printed
LAWS OP UTAH,
* therein, but if no newspaper be printed in the judicial dis-
trict, a copy of such petition must be posted for a like
period at three of the most public places in the county in
which the property of such corporation is situated, or in
which the petitioner resides, if the petition is for the
change of the name of a natural person, and proofs must
be made of such publication or posting before the petition
can be considered.
SEo. 1131. Such application must be heard at such Hearing f apl
time during the term as the court nmay appoint, and o1- ptiti,,n and
.ections may be filed by any person who can, in such ob- emonstrance.
jections, show to the court good reasons against such
change of name. On the hearing the court may examine
upon oath, any of the petitioners, remonstrants, or other
persons, .touching the application, and may mske an
order changing the name or dismissing the application, as
to the court may seem right and proper.
TITLE IX.
OF ARBITRATION.
SEc. 1135. Persons capable of contracting may sub- What may be
mit to arbitration any controversy which might be the ,,.itte to ar-ofbration andsubject of it civil action between them, except a question of when.
title to real property in fee or for life. This qualification
(toes not include questions relating merely to the partition
or boundaries of ral property.
* Syc. 1136. The submission to arbitration must be Sl,,,,ssion to
in writing and may be to one or more persons, In writing,
SEC. 1137. It may be stipulated in the submission Submis.ion "may
that it be entered s an order of ttie" court, for which pr- be ented a% allord r of the
pose it must be filed with the clerk of the court where the court.
parties, or one of them reside. The clerk must thereupon
enter in his register of actions a note of the submission,
with the names of the parties, the names of the arbiitra-
tors, the date of sulmission, when filed, and the time lim-
ited by the submission, if' aly', within which tile award,
must be made. When so enterexl, the subiniis4iol eullmot
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S E C T I O N . S E C T I O N . 
8861 Jurisdiction. 8863 Publication of petition for. 
8862 Application for change of name, 8864 Hearing of application and r e -
how made; corporation, change monstrance, 
of name. 
§ 3861. s 1128. Applications for change of names must 
be heard and determined by the district courts. 
§ 3862. s 1129. A l l applications for change of names 
must be made to the district court of the judicial district where 
the person whose name is proposed to be changed resides, by 
petition, signed by such person; and i f such person is under 
twenty-one years of age, by one of the parents, i f l iv ing; or 
i f both be dead, then by the guardian; and i f there'be no guard-
ian, then by some near relation or friend. The petition 
must specify the place of birth and residence of such person, 
his or her present name, the name proposed, and the reason 
for such change of name, and must, i f the father of such per-
son be not living, name as far as known to the petitioner, the 
near relatives of such person, and their place of residence. 
Any religious, benevolent, literary or scientific corporation, 
or any corporation bearing or having for its name or using or 
being known by the name of any benevolent or charitable 
order, or society, may, by petition, apply to the district court 
of the judicial district in which the property of said corpora-
tion is situated, for a change of its corporate name. Such 
petition must be signed by the trustees of the corporation, 
or by a majority of them, and must specify the date of the 
formation of the corporation, its present name, the name pro-
posed, and the reason for such change of name. Upon filing 
such petition on behalf of such corporation, the same pro-
ceedings must be had as upon application for changes of name 
of natural persons. 
• § 3863. s 1130. A copy of such petition must be pub-
lished for four successive weeks, in some newspaper printed 
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in the judicial d istr ict , i f a newspaper be pr inted therein, but 
if no newspaper be printed i n the judic ial distr ict , a copy of 
such petition must be posted for a l ike period at three of the 
most public places i n the county i n which the property of 
such corporation is situated, or i n which the petitioner resides, 
if the petition is for the change of the name of a natural per-
son, and proofs must be made of such publication or posting 
before the petition can be considered. 
§ 3864. s 1131. Such application must be heard at such Hearing of ap 
* 1 r plication and 
time during the term as the court may appoint, and o b j e c - r c m o n 8 t r a n c c -
tions may be filed by any person who can, in such objections 
show to the court good reasons against such change of name. 
On the hearing the court may examine upon oath, any of the 
petitioners, remonstrants, or other persons, touching the ap-
plication, and may make an order changing the name or dismiss-
ing the application, as to the court may seem r ight and proper. 
T I T L E I X 
O F A K B X T B A T I O N 
SECTI O N . S K C T I O N . 
3865 What may be submitted to arbi - 3870 Award to be in writ ing: when 
trution and when. judgment must be entered. 
38W Submission to arbitration to be 3871 Award may be vacated in cer -
In writing. tain cases. 
38ti7 Submission may be entered as 3872 Court may on motion modify or 
an order of the court; revoca- correct the award, 
tion. 3873 Decisions on motion subject to 
38*>8 Powers of arbitrators. appeal, but not the judgment 
3869 Majority of arbitrators may de- entered before motion. 
termine any question; they 3874 If submission be revoked and an 
must be sworn. action brought, what to be r e -
covered. 
§ 3865. s 1135. Persons capable of contracting may s u b - W n a t m a y b e 
mit to arbitrat ion any controversy which might be the s u b - f t r b i t r a t ! o n t o 
ject of a c i v i l action between them, except a question of t i t le a n c 
to real property in fee or for l i f e . This qualification does not 
include questions relating merely to the part i t ion or bounda-
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394 M I N O R S — N A M E S . 
1539. I d . P its . S l a c k coa l burn ing . T h e o w n e r , lessee, o r a g e n t of 
a n y m i n e , w h o , h y w o r k i n g s u e h m i n e , has caused , o r m a y herea f t e r cause, t i n * 
sur face o n t h e p u b l i c d o m a i n , commons, h i g h w a y , o r o t h e r l a n d s t o cave i n a n d 
f o r m a p i t i n w h i c h persons o r a n i m a l s a r e l i k e l y t o f a l l , s h a l l cause such cave o r 
s i n k t o be f i l l e d u p , o r t o be s e c u r e l y fenced w i t h a- g o o d , l a w f u l f ence ; a m i i f he 
has heaped o r p i l e d , o r s h a l l hereafter heap o r p i l e , s l a c k coa l o n t h e surface, a n d 
sueh s l a c k c oa l s h a l l t a k e l i r e a n d e n d a n g e r t h e l i f e o r sa fe ty o f a n y person o r 
a n i m a l , he s h a l l cause t h e f i r e t o be e x t i n g u i s h e d o r t h e b u r n i n g coa l t o be 
inc l o s ed w i t h a su f f i c i en t fence. [<<. L . § 2 2 4 1 . 
1540. Pena l ty . A n y p e r s o n f a i l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s 
c h a p t e r s h a l l be deemed guilty o f a misdemeanor, f i n d s h a l l be l i ab l e f o r a l l 
damages . [ 0 . L . § 2242 . 
T I T L E 4 3 . 
M I N O R S . 
1541. Per iod of minor i ty . T h e p e r i o d of m i n o r i t y e x t e n d s i n ma l e s to 
t h e age o f t w e n t y - o n e y e a r s ; a n d i n females t o t h a t o f e i g h t e e n y e a r s ; b u t a l l 
m i n o r s o b t a i n t h e i r m a j o r i t y b y m a r r i a g e . [ 0 . L . ^ 2560 , 
Guardianship terminated by marriage, \  :t!HMi. 
1542. Minors ' contracts . Disaff irmance. A minor is bound not 
o n l y b y c o n t r a c t s f o r necessaries b u t a lso by h i s o t h e r c o n t r a c t s , unless he 
d i s a f f i r m s t h e m before o r w i t h i n a. r easonab le t i m e a f t e r he a t t a i n s h i s m a j o r i t y 
a n d restores t o t l i e o t h e r p a r t y a l l m o n e y o r p r o p e r t y r ece i v ed b y h i m by v i r t u e 
of sa id c o n t r a c t a n d r e m a i n i n g w i t h i n h i s c o n t r o l a t a n y t i m e a f t e r a t t a i n i n g h i s 
m a j o r i t y . [C. L ^ 2 5 6 1 . 
The rule that an infant is bound fey his contracts nature of the contract and tin- situation of the 
unless he disaffirms them w i th in a reasonable time parties. No pa r t i cu l a r manner of disatl irmance is 
after his majority, applies only to such cont racts as necessary. I d . Persons cannot disaffirm a parol 
are beneficial to the infant, ( irocsheck v. Hell . I partition of the i r father 's land made during the i r 
U . '.i'.irt. I n determining what is a " reasonable minor i ty , if, after a t ta in ing majority, they retain, 
time" w i t h i n w h i c h an infant must disaffirm a control , and se l l parts a l lotted to them. Wh i t l e 
contract, the j u r y can take into consideration the more v. Cope. 11 V. I H l ; 10 1\ 256. 
1543. Id . No c o n t r a c t c a n be t h u s d i s a f f i r m e d i n cases w h e r e on accoun t 
of t h e m i n o r ' s o w n m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as t o h i s m a j o r i t y , or f r o m h i s h a v i n g 
engaged i n bus iness as a d u l t , t h e o t h e r p a r t y had good reason t o be l i eve t h e 
m i n o r capab l e of c o n t r a c t i n g . [ ( \ L . ^ 2562 . 
Minor may keep bank account, \  Itrtl. 
1544. P ayment for pe r sona l services . W h e n a contract f o r t h e per-
sonal services o f a minor has been m a d e w i t h h i m a l o n e , a n d those serv ices a r e 
a f t e r w a r d performed, p a y m e n t m a d e t h e r e f o r t o such m i n o r i n accordance w i t h 
the t e r m s of t h e contract, is a f u l l s a t i s f a c t i on for those services, a n d t h e parent 
o r g u a r d i a n c a n n o t recover therefor a second t i m e . [ ( ' . L . ^ 2ot>.'». 
T I T L E 4 4 . 
N A M ES. 
1545. Change of name of person, city, t own , etc. Petit ion. A n v 
person , c i t y , t o w n , p r ec ine t . o r school d i s t r i c t , d e s i r i n g to change h i s o r i ts n a m e . 
N A T U R A L G A S . 395 
may f i le a p e t i t i o n t h e r e f o r i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f t h e c o u n t y w h e r e l o c a t e d , 
s e t t i n g f o r t h : 
1. T h e cause for w h i c h t h e change o f n a m e is s o u g h t . 
2. T h e n a m e p roposed . 
3. I f t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s a p e r s on , t h a t he h a s been a b o n a f ide c i t i z e n o f t h e 
c o u n t y f o r t h e y ea r i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r to t h e t i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n : or , i f t h e p e t i -
t i o n e r is a c i t y , t o w n , p r e c i n c t , o r schoo l d i s t r i c t , that t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e lega l 
v o t e r s t h e r e o f des i re s u c h change o f name, a n d t h a t t h e r e is n o o t h e r city, t o w n , 
p r e c i n c t , or school d i s t r i c t , i n t h i s s ta te , o f t h e n a m e s o u g h t . [C. L . 3§ 222* 
3861-2*. 
1546. Hear ing . Proo f of pub l icat ion . Order. A t a n y subsequent , 
term, t h e dist r i c t c o u r t m a y order t h e change o f n a m e as r eques ted , u p o n p r oo f 
in open cour t o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e p e t i t i o n , a n d t h a t the re ex i s t s p r o p e r cause 
for g r a n t i n g t h e same, a m i t h a t t h i r t y days* previous notice o f t h e h e a r i n g 
thereof has been g i v e n i n a newspape r p u b l i s h e d o r having a general circulation 
i n t h e c o u n t y . [('. L . 228*; 3862-4. 
1547. Effect of change. S u c h proceed ings sha l l i n no m a n n e r af fect a 
legal a c t i o n or p r o c e ed ing t h e n p e n d i n g , no r a n y r i g h t , t i t l e , o r i n t e r e s t w h a t -
soever. 
T I T L E 4 5 . 
NATURAL i I A S . 
1548. Conf ining gas in unused we l l . A n y person o r c o r p o r a t i o n i n 
possession as o w n e r , lessee, agen t , o r manage r , o f a n y w e l l i n w h i c h n a t u r a l gas 
has been found, s h a l l , un less sa id gas is b e ing u t i l i z e d , w i t h i n three m o n t h s from 
the completion o f said w e l l , o r at a n y time u p o n ceas ing t o use such w e l l , eon-
l ine t h e gas i n sa id w e l l u n t i l such t i m e as i t s h a l l be utilized; provided, tha t 
t h i s s ec t i on s h a l l not apply t o a n y w e l l ope ra t ed as a n o i l w e l l . [*!»*_'. p . 4 1 . 
1549. P lugg ing abandoned we l l . I ' p o n a b a n d o n i n g or ceasing to 
o p e r a t e a n y w e l l s u n k i n e x p l o r i n g f o r gas. t h e pe r son o r c o r p o r a t i o n t h a t s u n k 
t h e same s h a l l l i l l u p t h e w e l l w i t h sand o r r o ck s e d i m e n t to a d e p t h o f at least 
t w e n t y feet above the gas -bea r ing r o c k , a n d d r i v e a r o u n d , seasoned wooden 
p l u g , a t least t h r e e feet i u l e n g t h , equa l in d i a m e t e r to t h e d i a m e t e r o f t h e we l l 
b e l o w t h e cas ing , t o a po in t a t least l i v e feet b e l ow t h e bottom o f t h e c a s i n g : a n d 
i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r drawing t h e eas ing , sha l l d r i v e a r o u n d , seasoned wooden 
p l u g , to a p o i n t j u s t be low w h e r e t h e l owe r end of t h e cas ing res ted , w h i c h p l u g 
sha l l b e a t least t h r e e feet i n l e n g t h , t a p e r i n g i n f o r m , a n d of t h e same d i a m e t e r 
a t t h e d i s t a n c e of e i gh teen inches f r o m t h e s m a l l e r e n d as t h e d i a m e t e r of t h e 
hole be l ow the po in t a t w h i c h it is t o be d r i v e n . A I t e r t he p l u g has been pro-
perly d r i v e n t h e r e sha l l be I d l ed on t h e t o p of t h e same, s and o r rock s ed imen t 
to a d e p t h of a l least five feet; provided, t h a t i n case such geo l og i ca l f o r m a t i o n 
sha l l be encountered i n t h e bore as t o make some other m e t h o d m o r e e f fec t ive 
for preventing f l o od ing by w a t e r f r o m superposed s t r a t a , t h e inspec to r m a y d i r e c t 
wha t o t h e r p l a n sha l l be p u r s u e d w i t h o u t u n r e a s o n a b l e cost to t h e o w n e r o r 
lessee of t h e w e l l . pp . 4 1 - 2 . 
1550. Pena l t ies for neglect. A n y person or corporation w h o sha l l 
violate a n y of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of sec t ions fifteen h u n d r e d a n d f o r t y - e i g h t a n d f i f teen 
h u n d r e d a n d f o r t y - n i n e , sha l l be l i a b l e to a p e n a l t y of t w o hundred d o l l a r s for each 
a n d every violation thereo f , a n d to t h e f u r t h e r p e n a l t y o f t w o h u n d r e d dollars for 




















the other::;, exc~ept in the C!ll::les hei·ein expJ'('Ssly eli· 
l'ec>ted or po1•mitted. 
• 
AR'J:ICLE VI. 
r_.. gGJSLA'J.'IVg D 1•1P AH'l'l\11•1N'l', 
SIW'l'ION 1. ~Phe legisl1ttive power of thi::; State 
shall be vested in a Sena.te and House of Representa-
tives, whieh shall be de:::~ig-na.tec1 the Leg-h;lature of the 
State of Utah. 
Sec. 2. Regular se:::~sion::; of the Legh;lature shall 
be held biennially nt the ::;eat of government; and, ex-
cept the first ses::~ion thereof shall begin on the second 
:Monday in .Ta.mmry next n.fter the election of members 
of the House of Hepresentn.tives. 
Sec. a. 'l1lw members of the Hou::;e of Hept•esen-
t.ttives, afte1· the first election, ::;hall be cho::;en by the 
qualifieu electors of the reHpeetive repre:::~entative di::;-
tricts, on the first '11ne::;da.y after the fh·st Moncla..r in 
November, 1896, and biennially the1·ea.fteJ', 'l1heh· 
term of office shaH be two years, from the first dn,y of 
January next aftel' their election. . 
Sec. 4. 'ill1e SenatOl'::; shall be chosen by the tJunl-
ified electors of the 1•espective ::;enatm•ial dist1·icts, nt 
the l!imne times nntl pl:wes as membei'H of the House of 
Representatives, aml tbeil· term of office sha.ll he four 
years from the first day of .Ta.muuoy next after theil· 
election; Pnwided, '!llutt the SenatfH'S elected in lSfW 
shall he divided by lot into two classes as nearly equal 
as mrw be; seats o.f Senators of the first class slutll be 
\'n.cated at the expiration of two years, am1 those of the 
seuond elass at the expieation of four years; so that one-
half, as nearly as possible, sha.ll he chosen biennially 
thereafte1·. In case of increase in the numhei' of Sena-
tors, they shall be annexed by lot to one or the other 
of the two elasse::;, sn as to keep them as nea1•ly equal 
as prn.ctiea.ble. 
See. 5. No person shall be eligible to the office 
of Senator or H.epl'esentative, who is not a. citizen of the 
United States, 25 years of age, a qualified voter in the 
r1istrict from which he is c•hoseu, a resident for three 
ven,rs of the Sta.te, and for one yem· of the district 
from which he is elected. ' 
Sec. 6. No person holding any public offiee of 
p1•ofit m· t.rust under authority of the United States. oJ• 
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Sec. 22. rnlE' ennetilw elam;e of eVel'" law slmll . 
' ~ . ·' . ~~~~-he: 11 /Je 1/. euaf'lerl b.tJ the Le(/18/atu.J'e o.f the 8trtle rd Utah," 
ancl no bill m· joint resolution slmll he passed, except 
with the assent iJf ltmajority of all the membm•s elected 
in each house of the Logislntm;e, mu1 after it has been 
J'eac1 three times. r.rhe- vote upon the fiaal pm;sa,ge of 
n,ll bills shall be by yeas and nays; and no law shall be 
J'evised 01' amencletl by refel'eJlce to its title only; hut 
the act as revised, m· sedion as amended, shall he J'e· 
enaeted and lHthlished at length. 
Sec. 28. Except geneml appropriation bills, and No un1 •111111 
hills fm· the eodHiC'ation and 1rene1·al1·evision of laws pn•• contulntnu 
• , . b , ' n10ro thnu ono 
no lnll shall he pa~sec1 contmmng more than one subJect, •uhJoct. · 
which slmll J,e c]enl'l.Y expl'essell in its title. 
Rec. 24. ~Phe p1•esiding officer of each house, in mu., hnw 
tl ' ] I . I ' I ] ' 1 1 11 •lunetl. w ))]'ese~we of t 10 wuse ovel' w 1w 1 1e presH es, s m 
sign all hills and joint l'esolutions passed by the Legis-
lattll'e, aftel' their titles have been publidy read im-
mediatelv befol'e sin·nhw, and the faet of stwh sio·nitw 
,J "' 1:> 1"'1 l:'l 
shall be ente!·ed upnn the jm11'lml. 
See. 21). All aets shall be offlciltlly published, and tt!l,~J.1W:~~~­
no aet shall take effect until so published, nor until otfoct;,.·hun. 
sixty lla.ys after the a<ljom·nment of the session at 
whid1 it passed, unless the Legislature by 11 vote of 
two-thirds of all the memhei'H elected to eac~h house, 
shall othe1·wise direet. 
Sec. 2H. 1'he Legislatme is prohibitt~cl fl'om lm- Lt•giHtnlnro 
I' ll , mu•t nnt onncl acting any private 01' spedal law::; in the ·o OWlllg'HJIOCinllttwHnn. 
(~ases: 
1. Granting eli vot·ce. m,·orco. 
:3. Changing the ncmws of pm•sons 01' places, ohnug1n11nnml'. 
OJ' <!Ollstitutiug one person the lu~ir at law of another. 
a. Loc:ttinu: Ol' elmn!.!'iiH!.' <~ount.r sea,ts. County MUIIIH, " • · " f llt•Hnlntlng -!. Hegulntill!.!.' the jm•h;clietion :mel duties o dntlnsor ' ~· julltiCOH, 
jm;twes of the peace. or1ruos mul 
;), Punishing m·imes and misdemeanors. mlstlomnnnor•. 
• ]"'> 1 • I t' f t f , t' ll~gnlntlnu h. :\.eg'U atmg t 1e pl'ILC WC 0. eOUI' S 0 JUS lC'e, t'onrt prncllco. 
7. Proviclinu· fm• rL chan!.!.'e of venue in eivil or Chnnso or •' ~ vonuo. 
criminal aetions. 
1 . AIIHOHMIIIg lllltl 8. Assessing and col ectmg taxes. colloctlnglnX~H. 
H. H.egulating the intet•est on money. chnnslnglnwnr 
10. Chmwino· the law of descent 01' succession. •lescont. 
ll. Hegula,ti~lg' county and township affairs. ~~~~~~;~~~tl 
12. Incorporating' cities, towns m: vilhtges; chang- township nffnlr" 
ing or mnenclino· the eharter of nny city town orincorpornunu 
• } ' • 1"'1 ' t' • lt• ' • t' <ltlo•, otc, vtl nge; laymg out, opemng, vaen mg OJ' a ermg own 
